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NEWSPAPER-RADIO JOINT OWNERSHIP: UNBLEST
BE THE TIE THAT BINDS"
COMMON ownership of two or more sources of mass information I has
been accelerating in recent years through acquisitions by newspapers of
local radio stations. 2 This development is particularly disturbing since
over-all competition in the distribution of news and opinion has been
suffering from creeping atrophy.
Contemporary surveys indicate that of the 1394 communities with daily
* Mansfield Journal v. FCC, 180 F.2d 28 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
1. The owner of a news distributing medium places the imprint of his predispositions
upon the news by virtue of his selection of the news events to be featured and the manner
of their presentation. By extending his control to other media, he extends the scope of a
single partisan selection, thereby excluding other, different ideas from the arena of public
opinion. See Judge Learned Hand in United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362,
372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943), aff'd, Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
Consequently, the FCC position in the Mayflower case, 8 F.C.C. 333 (1941)-the
broadcaster must be impartial in his overall presentation of public issues--is extremely
difficult to carry out. See YouR NEWSPAPER 25 (Swirsky ed. 1947). That this is recog-
nized by the FCC may be inferred from its attempts to allocate broadcast licenses to
different persons within a community. See, e.g., Easton Publishing Co., 4 PIn &
FISCHER RADIo REG. 176 (1948) rev'd and remanded on other grounds, 175 F.2d 344 (1949);
James A. Noe, 3 PIKE & FISCHER RADIO REG. 1821 (1949). Cf. Midland Broadcasting
Co., 3 PIKE & FISCHER RADIO REG. 1961 (1948). For a discussion of present patterns of
broadcaster evasion of the unreal "fairness" formula of the Mayflower doctrine, see Note,
The Mayflower Doctrine Scuttled, 59 YALE L.J. 759, 767 (1950) ; Note, Radio Editorials
and the Mayflower Doctrine, 48 COL. L. RaV. 785, 792 (1948).
While the Commission on the Freedom of the Press felt that diversity of outlook was
important, it thought diversity did not necessarily depend upon facts of ownership.
Nevertheless, in one situation-cross-channel ownership within a community-the Commis-
sion concluded that diversity would be seriously curtailed. CHAFER, 2 GovERXlnRNT AND
MASS ComMUNcATIoNS 623, 655 (1947). See also the testimony before the Press Commis-
sion of the Nieman Fellows, id. at 520; Fly, Freedom of Speech and the Press, in SAFE-
GUARDING CIVIL LIBERTIES TODAY 61, 68 (Sabine ed. 1945). The newspaper industry's lead-
ing spokesman has concurred with this position. Editor & Publisher, Dec. 31, 1938, p. 20.
This problem was explored during the newspaper-radio investigation conducted during
1941-42. See Hearings before the FCC in re: Orders 79 and 79-A, Docket 6051, Exs.
397-9, 416-18.
2. The problem has been important for some time. See Shapiro, The Press, the
Radio and the Law, 6 AIR L. Rv. 128, 153 (1935). In 1934, many independent station
owners feared that the entire industry might be taken over by the newspaper industry.
Newsweek, June 16, 1934, p. 28. By 1937, the FCC was seriously concerned. Opinion of
FCC General Counsel Gary, February 13, 1937 reported in WARNER, RADIO AND TELE-
VISION LAW 207 n.3 (1948). Four years later, the Commission began a full scale in-
vestigation. See note 26 infra. For a study of the increase in newspaper-owned stations,
see notes 8 and 9 infra.
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newspapers,3 only 117 have two or more competing. 4 And except for the
nation's twenty-four largest cities, there has been a tendency to eliminate
competition completely.5 A compensating trend in radio has failed to de-
velop-out of 1300 cities with radio stations, only 30 per cent have competing
outlets.6 Viewing both media together, more than seventy per cent of the
3. The census defines a community as an incorporated place with a population of
2500 or more. Each community, whether or not it comprises part of a metropolitan area, is
treated as an entity. There were 3,459 communities in the United States in 1940. XVItIh
Cenms of the United States-1940, 1 POPULATION 25 (1942). Since then, 67 new com-
munities have come into existence. Communication to the YALE Law JoufliAL from
T. J. Slowie, Secretary, FCC, dated December 7, 1949, in Yale Law Library.
These communities have 1770 newspapers. Nixon, The Problem of Ncwstapcr
Monopoly in MASS COMMUNicATioNs 158 (Schramm ed. 1949). Today, there are 830 less
newspapers in the United States than in the peak year of 1909 when 2600 were published.
Although the number of cities with newspapers has increased since that time, the ratio be-
tween newspapers and communities has steadily decreased. It was 3.4 in 1910; 2.6 in 1920;
and 1.7 in 1930. LEE, THE DALY NnwsPkFma Ix AmtEecA 65-6 (1937).
4. Another 174 cities have two or more newspapers, either jointly owned or managed
in such a way as to potentially eliminate competition. Of these, 161 are single owner
cities. In the other 13, the two existing dailies have entered into partial combinations
which place their business offices on a non-competitive basis. Nixon, Concentration and
Absenteeism in Newspaper Ownership, 22 JouRNmISm QUARTLy 97, 101 (1945).
There are only 1300 newspaper owners. And 91.6 per cent of the 1394 daily newspaper
cities had a single publisher. Nonetheless, 58.8 per cent of the total circulation is com-
petitive, for most of the daily circulation is in the larger communities where competition
still exists and probably will continue to thrive. Nixon, The Problem of Newspapcr
Monopoly in MAss COMMUNICATIONS 158 (Schramm ed. 1949).
5. This trend works to eliminate all but one newspaper in towns of less than
50,000 population, to combine two papers under one publisher in cities of 50,000 to
400,000 and to maintain competition only in cities of more than 400,000 population. Ibid.
The distribution of daily newspaper competition by cities as of Janaury 1, 1948 was:
Total Cities Comnpetithe Percentage
Size of City Vith Dailies Cities Competitk'c
Less than 10,000 547 14 2.6
10,000-50,000 656 37 5.6
50,000-100,000 94 15 16.0
100,000-200,000 51 20 39.2
200,000-300,000 17 6 35.2
300,000-400,000 12 8 66.7
400,000 or over 17 17 100.0
Communication to the YA=E LAW JOuRNAL from Prof. M. B. Nixon, Professor of Journal-
ism, Emory University, dated December 4, 1949, in Yale Law Library.
6. In 1949, 378 of the 1,311 communities possessing broadcasting facilities had com-
peting stations. Communication to the YALE LAWv JOURNAL from T. J. Slowie, Secretary,
FCC, dated December 7, 1949 in Yale Law Library. These communities had Z179 standard
(AM) stations and 865 frequency modulation (FM) stations. The overwhelming majority
of commercial FM stations were authorized to All licensees and were jointly operated, so
that programs broadcast over the AM stations were transmitted simultaneously by the FM
station. 15 FCC AxN. REP. 40, 53 (1950).
In 1948, 356 communities had competing stations. Of these, 156 had two stations, 87
had three and 133 had four or more. In the Matter of Editorialidng By Broadcast Licensees,
OFFIcIAL iREPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGs BFXORE THE FEDERAL COmnUNICATIONS Co MissioN
Docket No. 8516, Exhibit 26 (1948).
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communities with dailies also have at least one radio station.' But 407
of the radio stations are affiliated with local newspapers," and there are
170 "one-to-one" cities where the only radio station is affiliated with the
only newspaper.9 With such a limited number of mass media, these markets
bear scant resemblance to the ideal of "the widest possible dissemination
of information from diverse and antagonistic sources" within a community.
10
Application of the antitrust laws by the Department of Justice is one
possible remedy for the restrictions imposed by cross-channel ownership. 1
Antitrust law would compel divestiture if absorption of a radio station was
7. At least one newspaper and one radio station exist in 989 communities. Data com-
piled from BROADCASTING MAGAZINE YEAioox 69-325 (1950) and AY'ER & SoN's DIRnEC-
TORY or NEWSPAPERS AND PERIODICALS 1165-88 (1950).
8. The figures for previous years are as follows:
Affiliated Total Per cent
Year Stations Stations Affiliated
1931 55 612 9.0
1935 104 605 17.2
1939 184 764 24.1
1941 211 801 26.4
Based on statistics presented in Hearings before the FCC in re: Orders 79 and 79-A, Docket
No. 6051, Exs. 1, 3.
9. This represents a substantial increase over the number of local communications
monopolies existing in 1941. At that time, 351 of the 801 stations were located in "one-to-
one" comunities. In 111 of these, the only radio station was owned by the local newspaper,
and in three cities the only two radio stations were owned by the only local newspaper.
Hearings before the FCC in re: Orders 79 and 79-A, Docket No. 6051, Ex. 8, Table Ia.
Today, 623 of the 1,311 cities have only one radio station and one newspaper; in 170 of these
cities, they are jointly owned. In 75 other communities, the single newspaper owns one of
the two radio stations. Statistics on the contemporary situation are compiled from BROAD-
CASTING MAGAZINE YEARBOOK 521-26 (1950) and AYER & SON'S DIRECTORY or NEWs-
PAPERS AND PERIODICALS 1165-88 (1950).
10. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945).
It has been said that the paucity of local media is overcome by the number of available
outside media: stations located in nearby towns; regional and clear-channel stations; and
newspapers. But these media do not fulfil the same function as local media. Since each
community has peculiar local problems which are of little concern to outside media, there
must be diversification on the local level just as there must be diversity on the regional and
national level. See dissent in Stephen R. Rintoul, 3 PixE & FiSCHER RADIO REG, 96, 99
(1945) (Commission approved transfer of only local radio station to only local daily where
the community was serviced by a number of media originating in an out-of-state metropoli-
tan area). See also Editor & Publisher, Dec. 31, 1938, p. 20. Cf. Plains Radio Broadcast-
ing Co. v. FCC, 175 F.2d 359 (D.C. Cir. 1949). The Commission has taken this factor into
account. See Communications Act of 1934 § 307(b), 48 STAT. 1083 (1934), as amended,
50 STAT. 189 (1937), 47 U.S.C. §307(b) (1946) (hereinafter cited as the Communi-
cations Act), which was controlling in Samuel R. Sague, 3 PIXE & FISCOER RADIO RE(,
694 (1947). Accord, Huntington Broadcasting Co., 5 PiKE & FisciiE RADIO REa. 721
(1950).
11. The Communications Act specifically provides that the granting of a license shall
not estop the United States from proceeding against the licensee for violation of the anti-
trust laws. Communications Act § 311.
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the result of coercive tactics on the part of a newspaper, or if joint owner-
ship was used to exclude disfavored advertisers or to sell them time and
space only at unduly high rates.12 Generally speaking, divestiture is also
in order where joint ownership carries with it the power to exclude actual
or potential competitors, or where its dominance is such as to deprive con-
sumers of any real alternatives. But it is at least doubtful that mere com-
mon ownership of a radio station and newspaper in a single town would
violate the antitrust laws.' 4 It is even more doubtful that common owner-
ship of two out of three or four media would constitute a violation, even
though the public interest in diversity of news sources is to a considerable
extent compromised.
Practical considerations also weigh heavily against undue reliance on this
means of enforcement. The funds available to the Antitrust Division are
likely to remain meagre in relation to the job assigned to it. 15 Except where
12. United States v. Crescent Amusement Co, 323 U.S. 173, 189 (1944) ; Schine Chain
Theatres v. United States, 334 U.S. 110, 128 (1948).
13. See United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131 (1948) (monopoly power,
whether lawfully acquired or not, may violate Section 2 of the Sherman Act) ; United States
v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948) (monopoly even though no showing of intent to establish a
monopoly where the monopoly results as a consequence of buying power) ; Rostow, Monop-
oly under the Sherman Act: Power or Purpose?, 43 ILi. L. Ray. 745 (1949).
Hence, the data prepared by the Office of Radio Research to indicate that there was
very little difference between associated and non-associated stations in the number of news
programs, their distribution through the day or in general program structure may be ir-
relevant Hearings before the FCC in re: Orders 79 and 79-A, Docket No. 6051, Exs. 385-7.
But see note 14 infra.
14. The Supreme Court has defined the area of the market wherein control is alleged
as the zone of immediate competition for the product. See Mandeville Island Farms v.
American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219 (1948) (market for sugar beets in a small area
in northern California); United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 (1948) (mar-
ket for rolled steel in an eleven-state area) ; United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218
(1947) (taxi-cab market in Chicago).
It might be argued that.in the communication field the product is local news and the
market is the community. But compare the followving statement: "Anyone who owns and
operates the single theater in a town, or acquires the exclusive right to exhibit a film, has a
monopoly in the popular sense. But he usually does not violate § 2 of the Sherman Act un-
less he has acquired or maintained his strategic position, or sought to expand his monopoly,
or expanded it by means of those restraints of trade which are cognizable under § 1."
United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 106 (1948).
15. The Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice has never been equal to the
task of policing the entire economy. Before 1939, its staff never included more than 60
lawyers; today, it has no more than 200. And not until 1940 did. it ever receive an ap-
propriation of $1,000,000. Limitations of personnel alone have made it impossible to con-
tinue beyond the investigation stage every inquiry disclosing practices which are question-
able under the federal antitrust laws. A careful process of selection forces the Division to
consider the advantage that will be secured if the action is successful and the effect of such
action on future antitrust law enforcement See NVWLroN HamiLTo.,;, PArzxTcs or Coms-
PErrrIoN 59 (1940); Berge, Some Problems in the Enforcement of Antitrust Law, 38
Mic. L. REv. 462, 475 (1940) ; Fowler Hamilton, The Selection of Cases for Major In-
vestigation, 7 LAw%, & CO=x'aMORY PRoaRzaS 95, 96 (1940).
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national monopoly is involved, the Division necessarily tends to tackle only
selected offenders rather than an entire industry.16 It would be virtually
impossible to effect a uniform policy on cross-channel ownership by such
procedures. Moreover, it seems undesirable to divert the energies of the
Antitrust Division from the vast unregulated areas of the economy into a
field already subject to supervision by another federal administrative agency.
Administration action by the Federal Communications Commission,
therefore, is a more promising answer to the problems presented by news-
paper-radio mergers. The FCC is empowered to grant, renew or revoke
broadcasting licenses. 17 In exercising that power, it is confined by a statu-
tory guide no less broad than the "public interest." 18 And ever since the
16. See, for example, the Antitrust Division's pattern of attack on the movie industry.
It moved against all major producers and distributors, United States v. Paramount Pictures,
334 U.S. 131 (1948), but only against selected chain exhibitors. No attempt has been made
to deal with the problem of local monopolies. But see the civil antitrust suit instituted
against the Lorain Journal Co. in the United States Court for the Northern District of
Ohio. United States v. Lorain Journal Co., Civil Action No. 26823 (filed September 22,
1949) (attempt to monopolize the sale of mass advertising in the Lorain-Elyria area).
17. Communications Act §§ 307, 309(a), 312(a). The FCC can exercise broad dis-
cretion in determining whether grant of a license will be in the public interest. See, e.g.,
FCC v. WOKO, 329 U.S. 223 (1946). The Commission can engage in widespread investi-
gations to secure the necessary information for a proper discharge of its functions. Stahl-
man v. FCC, 126 F.2d 124, 127 (D.C. Cir. 1942) ; FCC, PUBLIC SERVIct REsrPoNSiILrTY OF
BROADCAST LICENSEES 54 (1946). Renewal applications are to be governed by the same
considerations as applications for new licenses. Communications Act § 307 (d). The grant
of a license to a broadcaster gives him no property right in the allocated channel. See
Trinity Methodist Church v. FRC, 62 F.2d 850, 853 (D.C. Cir. 1932) ; Yankee Network v.
FCC, 107 F.2d 212, 215 (D.C. Cir. 1939). While this power cannot be exercised without
reason, the Commission can refuse to extend the franchise when the operation of the station
is not in the public interest. Evangelical Lutheran Synod of Missouri v. FCC, 105 F.2d
793, 795 (1939).
Renewal proceedings furnish the FCC with an opportunity to submit the licensee's op-
eration of the station to a comprehensive evaluation. In the case of AM stations, this op-
portunity occurs once every three years. 47 CoDE FED. REgs. § 3.34 (1949). FM licenses are
granted for a lesser period. Id., § 3.218. While the Commission can terminate the fran-
chise at any time during its life, it has been chary in the use of this power, having utilized
it only twice in 23 years. Station WSAL, 8 FCC 34 (1940) ; Station KPAB, 5 Pin. &
FiscHER RADIO REG. 1297 (1950). See Note, 15 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 425, 429 (1940). The
major difference between denial and revocation proceedings lies in the placing of the burden
of proof that station operation will be in the public interest. In the latter, unlike refusals to
renew, the Commission must show that operation is not in the public interest. See WARNER,
RADIO AND TasiLvXSoN LAW § 12(g), (1948).
18. Communications Act §§ 151, 301. See Yankee Network v. FCC, 107 F.2d 212, 222
(D.C. Cir. 1939). See also SEN. REP. No. 772, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. (1926) (statement of
the objectives of the Radio Act of 1927, precursor of the present act). Congress imposed
upon the Commission the duty of protecting the public interest in the use of the common
property-the broadcast channels. Communications Act § 301.
Abandonment of the principle of restraining government action in matters involving the
press resulted from the singular nature of the broadcasting medium. Only in radio is the
number of available channels subject to physical limitation. Even today, despite the three-
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National Broadcasting Company case,1 9 the term "public interest" has in-
cluded the policies of the antitrust laws.
2 0
In a recent case, Mansfield Journal v. FCC,21 the Commission has for the
first time denied a broadcasting license to a newspaper on antitrust grounds.
Upon investigation and hearing, the Commission found that the Journal,
Mansfield's only newspaper, had sought to suppress competition in the
dissemination of news and to achieve an advertising monopoly by attempt-
ing to drive out the only other local mass medium-radio station WMAN.
Because these past practices presaged future abuse, the Journal's applica-
tion was denied.2 2 On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia approved both the ruling and the grounds on which the ruling was
made.
23
But more important, the court indicated that the Commission in the
exercise of its licensing power could look to a much broader range of con-
siderations than the unseemly behavior apparently indulged in by the ap-
plicant in the Mansfield case. The decision not only implied that a license
fold increase in commercial broadcasting stations since 1945, the number of qualified ap-
plicants exceeds the number of available franchises. 15 FCC ANN. REP. 36 (1950).
19. National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
20. "A licensee charged with practices in contravention of this standard cannot con-
tinue to hold his license merely because his conduct is also in violation of the antitrust laws
and he has not yet been proceeded against and convicted. By clarifying in Section 311 the
scope of the Commission's authority in dealing with persons convicted of violating the anti-
trust laws, Congress can hardly be deemed to have limited the concept of 'public interest' so
as to exclude all considerations relating to monopoly and unreasonable restraints upon com-
merce. Nothing in the provisions or history of the Act lends support to the inference that
the Commission was denied the power to refuse a license to a station not operating in the
public interest merely because its misconduct happened to be an unconvicted violation of the
antitrust laws." National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 223 (1943).
Earlier, the Commission, relying upon Section 313, had said: "The prohibitions of the
Sherman Act apply to broadcasting. This Commission, although not charged with the
duty of enforcing that law should administer its regulatory powers with respect to broad-
casting in the light of the purposes which the Sherman Act was designed to achieve." FCC,
REPoRT oN CHAIN BROADCASTING 46 (1941). The FCC has also taken official notice of the
policies of the Sherman Act when regulating the telephone and telegraph industries under
the grant of power contained in Section 151 of the Act. See, e.g., Western Union Division
v. United States, 87 F. Supp. 324, 334 (D.C. Cir. 1949), aff'd per curiam, 338 U.S. 864
(1950). See also McLean Trucking Co. v. United States, 321 U.S. 67 (1944) ; New York
Central Securities Corp. v. United States, 287 U.S. 12 (1932).
21. Mansfield Journal Co., 3 Pian & FiscHra RADIO REG. 2014 (1948), sub nora., Mans-
field Journal v. FCC, 180 F.2d 28 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
22. The components of the Commission's decision are inextricably entangled. The
Commission referred to its determination that diversification of the control of mass media
was desirable; applicant's past record; and the possibility that applicant would extend his
present course of action into the future if the application were granted. Whether the de-
cision that the grant would not be in the public interest rests on the past practices or ap-
plicant's probable future operation of the station is not clearly stated. Most probably, it
rests on both.
23. Mansfield Journal v. FCC, 180 F.2d 28 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
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could be denied if the grant would help achieve a monopoly; 24 it also
sustained the Commission's power to consider monopolistic practices of the
applicant whether or not they would constitute violations of the antitrust
laws. 25 It seems probable, therefore, that where appropriate the Commission
can deny or revoke a license on a showing, without more, that common
ownership will operate or has operated to reduce the diversity of news sources
which "public interest" requires.
So far, the power has not become a practice,21 though in recent competitive
hearings the FCC has favored non-newspaper applicants." Rather, analysis
of cases since the Stamford decision 2s of 1945 indicates that the Commis-
sion's primary considerations in licensing are the degree of identification
of the applicant with the community to be served; the probability that
those in control will devote their full efforts to the station; the extent of
previous experience in radio, particularly within the community involved;
and the scope of the proposed service.2" Apparently the issue of joint
ownership is controlling only when scrutiny of these factors has failed to pro-
duce a decision.
30
Since its power to incorporate the spirit as well as the letter of antitrust
law into its regulation is now firmly established, the Commission should
turn the Mansfield approach into a continuing policy. Wise administration
might call initially for a rule which would in substance forbid newspaper
ownership of radio stations where the effect would be to create a monopoly
or substantially to lessen competition in the mass dissemination of news.31
24. Id. at 33, 34. The court cites with approval that section of the Chain Broadcasting
Report which asserts the power of the Commission "to refuse licenses or renewals to any
person who engages or proposes to engage in practices which will prevent either himself
or other licensees from making the fullest use of radio facilities." (emphasis added). FCC,
REPORT ON CHAIN BROADCASTING 83 (1941).
25. 180 F.2d. 28, 34 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
26. The Commission has granted newspaper applicants both standard and FM licenses
in non-competitive hearings. See WARNER, RADIO AND TELvUsION LAW § 22 (g). It has
also granted franchises to newspapers in competitive hearings. Hamden-Hampshire Co., 4
PIKE & FISCHER RADIO REG. 504 (1949) ; Town Talk Broadcasting Co., 3 PIKE & Fiscunll
RADIO REG. 769 (1947) ; Orlando Daily Newspapers, 3 Pirm & FisCHER RADIO REG. 624
(1946). Cf. Midland Broadcasting Co., 3 PIKE & FIScHER RADIO REG. 1961 (1948).
There have been no attempts at dissolution for this cause since the investigation of
newspaper ownership began in 1941. For the inconclusive statement of policy issued after
the conclusion of the hearings, see 9 FED. REG. 702 (1944). See also Baucxm, FEEDOM
OF INFORMATION 83:(1949).
27. See, e.g., Fairfield Broadcasting Co., P= & FISCHER RADIO REG. 190 (1949);
Southern Tier Radio Service, 3 PixE & FISCHER RADIO REG. 211 (1946).
28. Stephen R. Rintoul, 3 PIiz & FIscHER RADIO REG. 96 (1945).
29. See cases cited in notes 26 and 28 supra.
30. See WARNER, RADIO AND TE.msiiN LAW § 22(g) n.13 (1948).
31. The Commission's powers are to be utilized to further "the public interest." Com-
munications Act, § 303 (g). The courts have upheld the grant of broad discretion to the
FCC to determine the most effective means of promoting this standard. See Ward v. FCC,
108 F.2d 486, 491 (D.C. Cir. 1939). The value of enacting rules to articulate the standards
[Vol. 591348
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The rule would serve principally as a mere statement of policy, "2 since the
FCC must grant a hearing before denying a license." But past experience
proves that an indication of policy often has a prophylactic effect.21
With or without a rule, however, effective enforcement of the policy will
depend on regular scrutiny of the non-competitive aspects of cross-channel
ownership in all licensing hearings. Depending on the status of the news-
for measurement of license applicant qualifications has been recognized. Heitmeyer v. FCC
95 F2d 91, 98 (D.C. Cir. 1937). Administrative Procedure in Giernent Agencies, Szri.
Doc. 8, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1941). The rule-making power has broad limits because
the intent of Congress was to grant the Commission "expansive powers." National Broad-
casting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 219 (1943).
32. Compare the Chain Broadcasting Regulations upheld in the NBC case. National
Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943). Justice Frankfurter, who had dis-
sented in the CBS case, Columbia Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 316 U.S. 407, 4-29
(1942), from the majority holding that the Regulations, 47 CoF FED. Racs. § 3.101-3.103
(1949), automatically denied a license to any station acting in derogation of their com-
mand, restated his original view. "[The regulations] are merely an announcement to the
public of what the Commission intends to do in passing upon future applicants for li-
cense.... No announcement of general licensing policy can relieve the Commission of
its statutory obligation to examine each application for a license." Id. at 431.
If the order is no more than a general statement of policy, it may not be subject to prior
judicial review. Urgent Deficiencies Act, 38 STAT. 219, 220 as incorporated and extended by
Communications Act § 402(b). Where the order sought to be reviewed does not of itself
adversely affect complainant, but will only affect him if the agency uses it as a basis for ac-
tion against him, resort to the courts is either premature or wholly beyond their province.
Rochester Telephone Co. v. United States, 307 U.S. 125, 130 (1939). But see Columbia
Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 316 U.S. 407, 416 (1942).
These requirements will make it virtually impossible to secure review before the Com-
mission acts on an application for renewal since the FCC has refused to issue declaratory
judgments under the power granted it by § 5(d) of the Administrative Procedure Act, 60
STAT. 239, 5 U.S.C. § 1004(d) (1946). See Cross-out Advertising Co., 5 Pxxr & Fiscnu
RADIO REG. 464 (1949).
The promulgation of rules would not only serve as an indication of the Commission's
stand on the matter, but would also allow the industry a chance to present its side of the
controversy. The right of interested persons to adequate notice and hearing is guaranteed
in rule-making proceedings. Administrative Procedure Act § 4, 60 ST. T. 237, 5 U.S.C.
§ 1001(d) (1946). These rights only apply to "substantive rules, which invoke true ad-
ministrative legislation." SEN. Dc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1946). In all prob-
ability, the proposed rule would bear a substantive tag. Nathanson, Some Comns,.ts on the
Administrative Procedure Act, 41 ILL. L. Ray. 363, 382 (1946).
33. Communications Act § 309(a). This section not only gives the Commission au-
thority to grant licenses without a hearing, but it also enables a license applicant to request a
hearing as of right before his license is denied. Ashbacker Radio Co. v. FCC, 326 U.S. 327
(1945).
34. Licensees have always been extremely jittery when dealing with the Commission.
In the back of their minds is the omnipresent threat of license revocation. Accordingly,
rules and even informal utterances by the FCC or its individual members have often been
followed instantly by conformance to the new pattern. See Comment, Administrat've En-
forcement of the Lottery Broadcast Provision, 58 YM.a L. J. 1093. 1110 (1949). But com-
pare the action of the industry when faced with the Chain Broadcasting Regulations. Wurni,
THE AmEmcAx RADio 162 (1947).
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paper applicant, the power may be exercised through original denial of a
license, or through revocation or refusal to renew. Depending on the case,
withholding of a license may be based on one of three grounds. First,
monopolistic practices engaged in by the applicant in the past may be
chalked up as a poor character qualification. 5 Second, the Commission may
find that cross-channel ownership has violated or is likely to violate the
antitrust prohibition against monopoly power. Third, the Comn'ission
may find that such ownership, while not violating antitrust law, is never-
theless inconsistent with the "public interest" in getting as much diversity
as is possible."
In some cases, joint ownership of a newspaper and radio station will not
be contrary to the public interest. Small communities, where the need to
promote diversity may be the greatest, often possess insufficient resources
to support competing information outlets." Enforcing competition here,
without regard to economic consequences, might only destroy one or both
media."' And perhaps in some large cities sources of information may be so
numerous that the effect of occasional cross-channel ownership may be in-
consequential.
A thorough but flexible application of the Mansfield doctrine would con-
tribute substantially to the public's interest in widely diversified control
over the instruments of mass communication. 9
HOWARD N. GILBERTt
35. Communications Act §308(b). See note 20 supra. Compare Mester v. United
States, 70 F. Supp. 118 (E.D.N.Y. 1947), aff'd per curiam, 332 U.S. 749 (1947) (denial of
application for transfer of station franchise based in part on prospective transferee's record
of federal regulatory law violations). Compare also Southern Steamship Co. v. NLRB, 316
U.S. 31 (1942). Here, the Court set aside an NLRB order issued without Board considera-
tion of a relevant criminal statute. ". . . [T]he Board has not been commissioned to ef-
fectuate the policies of the Labor Relations Act so singlemindedly that it may holly ignore
other and equally important Congressional objectives. Frequently, the entire scope of Con-
gressional purpose calls for careful accommodation of one statutory scheme to another,
and it is not too much to demand of an administrative body that it undertake this accom-
modation without excessive emphasis upon its immediate task." Id. at 47.
36. If the Commission is to carry out the program contemplated herein, it should have
some means at its command to allow the licensee a period of grace before the franchise is
discontinued. Issuance of a cease and desist order would enable the licensee to secure a
purchaser before final proceedings to cancel the license were instituted. The FCC has re-
quested Congress to provide it with the power to issue cease and desist orders. See Hear.
ings Before Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on H. R. 1973 § 312(b), 81st
Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1949).
37. See Report of the U.S. Senate, Special Committee to Study Problems of American
Small Business, Survival of a Free Competitive Press, The Small Newspaper, U.S. Senate,
79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947); FCC, AN EcoNoMIC STUDY OF STANDARD BROADCASTING,
esp. 59-97 (1947).
38. See CHAF.E, 2 GOVERNMENT AND MASS COMIUNICATIONS 660, 662 (1947).
39. While the Commission is capable of carrying out a program to eliminate cross-
channel ownership it may be worthwhile to determine if Congress will support such action.
Congressmen are particularly sensitive about any inroads on the broadcaster's privileges, for
]eel. 591350
